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.NOTES

May, 1956]

DIVORCE:

RIGHT OF STRANGERS TO ATTACK FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE.-Does

a stranger to an out-of-state divorce decree have the right to make a collateral attack
on such decree? This question involves a considerable lack of unanimity among
the various jurisdictions as to who is permitted to challenge the validity of a foreign
divorce and under what circumstances a challenge is authorized.
In In re Englund's Estate,1 decedents sister, on behalf of herself and other
collateral heirs, petitioned to remove decedent's purported wife as administratrix
of his estate on the ground that the alleged wife had never obtained a valid divorce
from her first husband and therefore her second marriage to the deceased was void.
The purported wife, prior to her marriage to decedent, had procured an Idaho divorce
from her former husband while both parties to the divorce were domiciled in Wash2
ington, having obtained substituted service on her husband. The Washington statute,
adopted from the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, provides that such foreign
divorce should be "of no force or effect," but the Washington Supreme Court, in a
five to four decision, reversing the trial court's granting of the petition, held that the
decedent's sister and other heirs were strangers to the divorce proceedings and, as
such, had no standing to attack the decree unless it affected some rights or interests
acquired by them prior to the time it was rendered.
Each state is required by the Constitution to give full faith and credit to the
public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state.3 However, the
present rule of law, laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Williams v.
North Carolina,4 recognizes that a judgment of divorce rendered in another state may
be declared void by a showing that the court lacked proper jurisdiction over the
divorce proceedings. This ruling has been limited by subsequent cases which prohibit
a collateral attack where the defendant in the divorce proceedings has appeared
in the action or was personally served within the jurisdiction of the divorce court.
The United States Supreme Court, in Sherrer v. Sherrer5 and Coe v. Coe,6 declared that
because of such appearance by the defendant, the doctrine of res judicata, combined
with the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, precluded any future collateral
attack by either party on the divorce court's finding of jurisdiction. The Sherrer rule
was extended by the decision of Johnson v. Muelberger,7 which held that the law
of the state which grants the decree governs the right of collateral attack by third
party challengers in the courts of sister states, where there has been participation
by the defendant in the divorce action.
Inasmuch as the defendant in the divorce suit in the case of In re Englund's
Estate received only substituted service, discussion will be limited primarily to the
right to make a collateral attack on a foreign ex parte divorce.
It was the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act s to
discourage "tourist divorces" by non-recognition of extra-state divorces by domiciliaries of the state enacting the statute and, under the Washington statute, such
foreign divorces are of "no force or effect." Nevertheless, the court, in the Englund
145 Wash.2d 708, 277 P.2d 717 (1954).
2RCW 26.08.20 (1949), c. 215 § 20. "A divorce obtained in another jurisdiction shall be of no
force or effect in this state if both parties to the marriage were domiciled in this state at the time the
proceeding for divorce was commenced."
' U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.
1325 U.S. 226 (1945).
r334 U.S. 343 (1948).
6 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
7340 U.S. 581 (1951).
89 UNIF. LAws ANN. 364.
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case, maintained that the statute declared no new law in Washington, and that it
was not to be construed so as to allow anyone the right to attack the decree.
California, also having adopted the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, has
enacted a similar statute 9 to that of Washington which expresses the rule of prior
decisions. In 1946 in Crouch v. Crouch,10 a leading case, the court said:
" - -it. is always competent to collaterally impeach a decree of divorce rendered in
another state by extrinsic evidence showing that the court
pronouncing it did not have
jurisdiction either of the parties or the subject matter." 11

A foreign divorce decree which is regular on its face carries a presumption of
validity and the burden of rebutting that presumption, by showing a jurisdictional
defect, is on the party attacking it. Where a divorce decree is collaterally attacked
for lack of jurisdiction by one whose rights or interests are prejudiced thereby,
it is well settled that the mere fact that he is a stranger to the proceeding does not
preclude him from making the attack.' 2 The determining factor as to the stranger's
right to maintain the attack is whether he has a sufficient interest adversely affected
and whether he is estopped from asserting that right. The further question arises,
however, as to whether the rights of the stranger, so adversely affected by the decree,
must have accrued prior to the rendition of the decree in order to collaterally attack
it or whether it is merely sufficient to show that he is being injuriously affected
by it at the time of the attack. There is a diversity of opinion among the courts on
this matter. The court in In re Englund's Estate decided that:
" . . .a stranger to the decree has no standing to attack it, unless '1 3such decree
affected some right or interest which he had acquired prior to its rendition."

Similar views have been adjudged by courts in Missouri, 14 Texas 15 and Florida.'167
But in Massachusetts the court in Old Colony Trust Company v. Porter,
while expressly emphasizing the fact that there were no property interests of the
third person involved at the time the decree was granted, held it proper for strangers
to a foreign divorce decree to attack it when their interests are subsequently affected
thereby. The court referred to numerous cases:18
" ...apparently representing the weight of authority, which in general support the
principle of collateral attack for want of jurisdiction upon decrees of divorce by persons
not parties to the divorce proceedings
whose rights would be impaired if effect were given to
the decrees as against them." 19
It is difficult, however, to determine definite rules on the question of a stranger's

right to attack a foreign divorce. The cases frequently fail to distinguish between
disallowing an attack where the stranger has no standing to challenge the validity
§ 150.1.
"Id. at 250, 169 P.2d at 900.
12 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) ; In re Pusey's Estate, 180 Cal. 368, 181 Pac.
648 (1919) ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Porter, 324 Mass. 581, 88 N.E.2d 135 (1949) ; In re Lindgren's
Estate, 293 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E.2d 849 (1944) ; Ex parte Nimmer, 212 S.C. 311, 47 S.E.2d 716 (1948).
1" See note I supra at 715, 277 P.2d at 721.
14 Reger v. Reger, 316 Mo. 1310, 293 S.W. 414 (1927).
1" National Loan & Investment Co. v. L. W. Pelphrey & Co., 39 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Civ. App.
1931).
" de Marigny v. de Marigny, 43 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1949).
" 324 Mass. 581, 88 N.E.2d 135 (1949).
s Goodloe v. Hawk, 72 App. D.C. 287, 113 F.2d 753 (1940) ; Brill v. Brill, 38 Cal.App.2d 741,
102 P.2d 534 (1940) ; In re Pusey's Estate, 180 Cal. 368, 181 Pac. 648 (1919) ; Urquhart v. Urquhart,
272 App.Div. 60, 69 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1947) ; In re Grossman's Estate, 263 Pa. 139, 106 Atl. 86 (1919).
CALIF. CIV. CODE

1028 Cal.2d 243, 169 P.2d 897 (1946).

'

See note 17 supra at 588, 88 N.E.2d at 140.
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of the decree and disallowing it where the attack is not well founded on its merits.
California decisions, 20 in most instances, have not expressly expanded the question
in point further than to permit a collateral attack by strangers where, if the judgment
were given full effect, some rights or interests of such strangers would be adversely
affected. But, in light of the results of the California cases, there is indication that,
if the enforcement of the divorce decree would unduly prejudice the rights of the
interested stranger, it would seem likely that a collateral attack would be allowed.
In the Englund's Estate case, reference is made to California cases 21 in support
of the argument that a third party cannot make a collateral attack. But, as is pointed
out in the dissenting opinion, these cases are not in point with the issue at hand.
These cases are considered under the estoppel doctrine, wherein the third parties,
by their own conduct, are estopped from bringing an action.
Although the drafters of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act intended to eliminate estoppel as an indirect means of upholding migratory divorces, California has
interpreted the act as not affecting existing state rules recognizing the estoppel'
doctrine and has continued to disallow an attack under certain circumstances. In
Rediker v. Rediker22 the court stated:
"The validity of a divorce decree cannot be contested by a party who has procured the
decree or a party who has remarried in reliance thereon, or by one
who has aided another
to procure the decree so that the latter will be free to remarry." 23

The decision in the Englund case was rendered, notwithstanding the express
language of the statute which declared such a divorce invalid. The underlying reason
for the court's reluctance to allow a collateral attack appears to be based on a public
policy interpretation of the statute as reflecting only a public concern with marital
relationship, rather than being applicable to cases involving private property, as
was here involved. Despite the strong dissent against-the "whittling away" of the
statute, the court seemingly arrived at a desirable result. Public policy requires
weighing the effects of the preservation of foreign divorces and remarriages against
the policy underlying the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act of discouraging recognition of extra-state divorces obtained in states lacking proper jurisdiction. Surely,
recognition of irregular, migratory divorces would outweigh the policy of disallowing
such divorces where the upsetting of them might result in bigamous marriages,
illegitimate children or other unfortunate disruptions of existing domestic relationships.
Regardless of the basis of the decision in this case, it exemplifies the very
definite problems and inconsistencies in this field of divorce law. Although the
Uniform Divorce Recognition Act has attempted to standardize and clarify divorce
laws, it is still necessary to consider the public policy of the states in protecting
the interests and welfare of their citizens. Until all the states have adopted uniform
divorce laws, we will continue to be plagued by the ever-occurring problems of foreign
divorces and the rights of interested parties.
--Edward P. Atkins.
'oDietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal.2d 497, 261 P.2d 269 (1953) ; In re Paul's Estate, 77 Cal.App.2d

403, 175 P.2d 284 (1946) ; Brill v. Brill, 38 Cal.App.2d 741, 102 P.2d 534 (1940) ; In re Pusey's
Estate, 180 Cal. 368, 181 Pac. 648 (1919). But see Mumma v. Mumma, 86 Cal.App.2d 133, 194 P.2d

24 (1948).

" Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal.2d 497, 261 P.2d 269 (1953) ; Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Gordon,
116 Cal.App.2d 681, 254 P.2d 644 (1953).

Cal.2d 796, 221 P.2d 1 (1950).
-Id. at 805, 221 P.2d at 6.
2235

